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Mind Flaws

Self & Social Bias · Quick Test

False Consensus Effect

Why does it seem like almost everyone would do what you'd do?

The experiment

Read the situation, make an estimate, and then say what you would do. There's no right answer.

As you're leaving your neighborhood supermarket, a man in a business suit asks whether you like shopping there. You honestly say that you do: besides being close to home, the store seems to have very good meat and produce at reasonable prices. He then reveals that a video crew has filmed your comments and asks you to sign a release letting the supermarket chain use the unedited footage in a TV commercial.

What percentage of people like you would sign the release?50% would sign · 50% would refuse

What happened?

First you estimated how many people would sign the release; then you said what you would do. In studies, these two answers go together: people who would sign think most others would sign too, and people who would refuse think most would refuse. Both majorities can’t exist at once. A single estimate doesn’t show the effect: it shows up when the two groups are compared.

Why does your brain do this?

To guess what others would do, the handiest sample is you. Your choice feels like the obvious answer to the situation, because you see its reasons from the inside, so it seems natural that others would think the same way. Anyone who would choose differently becomes the exception: someone shyer, more suspicious, or with some special reason.

When does this shortcut work well?

When you know nothing about other people, your own answer is real evidence: most of the time, it matches the majority’s. That’s why using yourself as a starting point is reasonable. The problem is giving that sample of one too much weight, to the point of ignoring better information that’s available.

Where does this show up in daily life?

It’s the feeling that “everyone” uses the same app you do, that “nobody” likes a song you dislike, or that your candidate will win easily because everyone you talk to is voting for them. At work, “I’d use it this way” quietly turns into “customers will use it this way.” One way out is to look for data from people outside your circle before concluding what “people” think.

Nerd Mode

Open Nerd Mode

Lee Ross, David Greene, and Pamela House named the false consensus effect in 1977. In Study 1, 320 college students read one of four stories that ended in a choice between two actions, like the supermarket story on this page. Participants estimated the percentage of their peers who would choose each option and said what they themselves would do. In all four stories, those who chose the first option thought more peers would choose it (75.4% on average) than those who chose the second (54.9%). “False” here means biased: the two groups can’t both be right.

The Many Labs 2 project (Klein and colleagues, 2018) repeated the supermarket story with 7,205 participants from many countries. People who would sign estimated on average that 69.2% would sign; people who would refuse, 43.4%. The effect was even larger than in the original (d = 1.18). Another story from the same study, about a traffic ticket, also replicated, with 7,827 people. A meta-analysis by Brian Mullen and colleagues (1985), covering 115 tests, had already found the effect consistently, at a moderate size.

Using your own answer as a clue isn’t a mistake in itself. But Joachim Krueger and Russell Clement (1994) showed that people weigh their own answer more than they should. The bias persisted even in people who had learned about it or had been given the real numbers. And when shown the answer of another, randomly drawn person, participants saw the bias in that person but kept leaning more on their own choice. They called this the truly false consensus effect.

The experiment here follows the order of the supermarket story in the study: estimate first, choice second. The result compares your estimate with that of the group that made the same choice in the replication, without saying that you personally got it wrong: any single estimate could be right.

Technical terms

  • Egocentrism
  • Social comparison
  • Numeric estimation

Discovery

Described by Lee Ross, David Greene e Pamela House in 1977.

Level of evidence

Robust evidence

Replicated in multi-lab studies or consistent meta-analyses.

Basis: Klein, R. A.; Vianello, M.; Hasselman, F.; Adams, B. G.; Adams, R. B.; et al. (2018). Many Labs 2: Investigating variation in replicability across samples and settings.

References

  1. Original studyRoss, L.; Greene, D.; House, P. (1977). The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13(3), 279–301.
  2. ReplicationKlein, R. A.; Vianello, M.; Hasselman, F.; Adams, B. G.; Adams, R. B.; et al. (2018). Many Labs 2: Investigating variation in replicability across samples and settings. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 1(4), 443–490.
  3. ReviewMullen, B.; Atkins, J. L.; Champion, D. S.; Edwards, C.; Hardy, D.; et al. (1985). The false consensus effect: A meta-analysis of 115 hypothesis tests. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21(3), 262–283.
  4. Original studyKrueger, J.; Clement, R. W. (1994). The truly false consensus effect: An ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 596–610.

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