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Mind Flaws

Judgment & Decision · Quick Test

Framing Effect

Does the same choice change when you change the words?

The experiment

Read the situation and choose one of the programs. There is no right answer.

Imagine your country is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. There are two programs to fight it, and the scientific estimates of each one's consequences are exact.

Which of the two programs would you choose?

What happened?

Each person is randomly given one of two versions of the problem. In one, the programs talk about lives saved; in the other, about deaths. But saving 200 out of 600 is the same as letting 400 die, and the gamble is also the same in both. In the original study, most people chose the sure program when they read “will be saved” and the gamble when they read “will die”. A single choice does not show the effect: it appears when the two groups are compared.

Why does your brain do this?

The mind does not judge outcomes in absolute numbers, but as gains or losses from a starting point. “Will be saved” makes you count from no one saved: each life is a gain, and a sure gain feels better than taking a risk. “Will die” makes you count from no one dead: each life is a loss, and a sure loss hurts so much that the gamble that might avoid it looks more attractive. The words pick the starting point for you.

When does this shortcut work well?

Being careful when you are ahead helps you not risk what you have already gained. And the way someone describes a situation often carries information: it shows what that person considers normal or expected. The trouble is when both descriptions say exactly the same thing and the choice still changes.

Where does it show up in daily life?

“Cash discount” sounds better than “credit card surcharge”, even though the price difference is the same. On labels, the same ground beef appeals more as “75% lean” than as “25% fat”. Before deciding, it is worth rewriting the option the other way, as gains and as losses, and seeing whether your choice still holds.

Deep Dive

Open Nerd Mode

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman published the problem in Science in 1981. Students at Stanford and at the University of British Columbia answered questionnaires in class. In the lives-saved version (152 people), 72% chose the sure program; in the deaths version (155 people), 78% chose the gamble. The authors report seeing the same reversal in groups of university faculty and physicians.

The explanation comes from prospect theory, which the two proposed in 1979: the value we give an outcome depends on whether it is a gain or a loss relative to a reference point. The value curve is concave for gains (risk aversion), convex for losses (risk seeking) and steeper for losses, which weigh more than gains of the same size. Framing moves the reference point and, with it, the attitude toward risk.

The Many Labs project (Klein and colleagues, 2014) repeated the problem in 36 samples from several countries, replacing the United States with the country of data collection and dropping the word “Asian” from “an unusual Asian disease”, as this page also does. The reversal was statistically significant in 86% of the samples, and none showed the opposite effect. The effect was smaller than in the original study (d = 0.60 versus 1.13), but solid. Before that, a meta-analysis by Anton Kühberger (1998), with 136 papers and nearly 30,000 participants, had already concluded that risky-choice framing is reliable, small to moderate in size, and highly dependent on the study design.

The name “framing” covers different effects. Irwin Levin, Sandra Schneider and Gary Gaeth (1998) separate risky-choice framing, the one on this page, in which the words change the willingness to take a risk, from attribute framing, in which they change only how a feature is judged. The classic example of the second kind comes from Levin and Gaeth (1988): the same ground beef was rated more favorably when labeled “75% lean” than “25% fat”, and the gap shrank after people tasted it.

This page compares your choice with that of the group who read the same version in the 1981 study. One choice does not show that you, personally, were swayed by the words: both options have the same expected value, and preferring either one is reasonable.

Technical terms

  • Framing
  • Risk
  • Heuristics

Discovery

Described by Amos Tversky e Daniel Kahneman in 1981.

Level of evidence

Robust evidence

Replicated in multi-lab studies or consistent meta-analyses.

Basis: Klein, R. A.; Ratliff, K. A.; Vianello, M.; Adams, R. B.; Bahník, Š.; et al. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability: A “Many Labs” replication project.

References

  1. Original studyTversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458.
  2. Original studyKahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.
  3. ReplicationKlein, R. A.; Ratliff, K. A.; Vianello, M.; Adams, R. B.; Bahník, Š.; et al. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability: A “Many Labs” replication project. Social Psychology, 45(3), 142–152.
  4. ReviewKühberger, A. (1998). The influence of framing on risky decisions: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75(1), 23–55.
  5. ReviewLevin, I. P.; Schneider, S. L.; Gaeth, G. J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76(2), 149–188.
  6. Original studyLevin, I. P.; Gaeth, G. J. (1988). How consumers are affected by the framing of attribute information before and after consuming the product. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(3), 374–378.

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